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In this report Appelbaum’s model is discussed in detail. The model
is also applied to the Dutch construction sector, allowing the degre e
of collusion to be ascertained. 
The model consists of five equations. One equation, the mark-up
equation, is derived from the assumption of profit maximization by
f i r m s. It is written in such a way that the degree to which firms (tac-
itly) collude serves as an explanatory variable for the mark-up. More
s p e c i f i c a l l y, the higher the observed mark-up the higher the degre e
of (tacit) collusion, other things being equal. Another equation, the
demand  equation describes  the  relation between  sales, price and
i n c o m e. Fu r t h e r m o re, three equations are used to describe the factor
d e m a n d s. In an extended ve rsion of the model, the degree of collu-
sion is endogenized by the variables net entry of firms and marke t
c o n c e n t ration.  The  model  is  estimated  simultaneously  by  FIML
(method of full information maximum likelihood). 
The estimation results for the Dutch construction sector lead to the
f o l l owing conclusions. The price elasticity of demand is about -0.9
and the income elasticity is about 1. The degree of collusion differs
significantly from zero: about 0.05. On a scale of 0 (no collusion to
1 (full collusion) this is not a high va l u e. The low value of the degre e
of collusion and the value of the price elasticity, which is not ve r y
small in absolute sense, results in a degree of oligopoly power (the
ratio between collusion and price elasticity) also not being very larg e.
As far as the explanatory variables for the degree of collusion are
concerned, we can conclude that net entry of firms has no influence
and market concentration has a significantly positive influence on
the degree of collusion. 
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In the early nineties there was an interesting discussion among econ-
omists and policy m a ke rs in  the Netherlands. The discussion  wa s
about competition in the Dutch economy and was initiated by the
formation of the internal market in Europe and by European legisla-
tion on competition. European legislation was stricter than Dutch
legislation. More and more articles and papers on the lack of com-
petition in Dutch economy we re published. The ultimate conclusion
was that indeed competition in the Dutch economy was not stro n g
enough. A result of this long series of articles was a new economic
p o l i cy from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It started with the de-
regulation and transformation of some government institutes into
p r i vate enterprises. The climax of this new policy is the new legisla-
tion on competition. Cartels and agreements about prices are forbid-
den from the beginning of January 1998, although the formation of
cartels was allowed before this date.
The idea behind the new policy on competition is that competition is
connected with a well structured economy: many entries and ex i t s,
l ow  persistence  of  pro f i t s,  high  productivity  and  growth  figure s,
dynamics and quality of the working population and low unemploy-
ment ra t e s. For example: competition may improve firms’ pro d u c t i v-
ity by reducing asymmetry of information between managers and
ow n e rs of a firm (Holmstrom 1982). Another possibility is that via
the incentives for R&D the productivity of firms will be influenced
( Vossen 1996). Intuitively it seems likely that competition incre a s e s
economic  performance.  Important  empirical  evidence  for  the
Netherlands has been found re c e n t l y. Lever (1997) concludes that
competition lowe rs prices and wages and Lever and Nieuwe n h u i j s e n
(1998) show that competition improves growth and the level of pro-
d u c t i v i t y. 
Because of the effect on we l f a re policy m a ke rs want to monitor the
b e h aviour of suppliers and buye rs. Measurement of the intensity of
competition is important and necessary. 
To measure competition, firms’ price cost margins or mark-ups have
been  used  in  the  Netherlands  during  the  last  ye a rs  (Prince  and
Thurik, 1992, Hindriks, 1999). Howeve r, firms’ mark-ups depend on
t wo va r i a b l e s, namely the conjectural elasticity of firms and the price
elasticity of demand. The conjectural elasticity measures the degre e
to which firms can influence total market supply. This elasticity is
7
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tacit collusion. 
For the Netherlands no attempts have been made to measure the two
i n d i c a t o rs on the behaviour of supply and demand. This paper will
m e a s u re both price elasticity and collusion of firms. Also some deter-
minants of competition will be tested.
A fra m ework is presented based on Appelbaum (1982)1. The model
will be applied to the Dutch construction sector for the period 1983-
1 9 9 3 .
We shall use a simultaneous model with five equations. Three equa-
tions related to the demand for production factors are included to
determine marginal costs. Further a market equation determines the
price elasticity of demand. The last equation is the mark-up or price
equation  which  defines  the  relation  between  marginal  cost  and
prices and provides an indication of the degree of collusion. Some
endogenizations of collusion will be tested. Collusion is assumed to
be linked with structure and contestability of marke t s.
The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
model  to  be  estimated.  The  data  and  estimating  techniques  are
described in  chapter  3.  Chapter 4  contains the  estimated re s u l t s.
Finally chapter 5 presents the conclusions and some suggestions for
further re s e a rc h .
8
I n t r o d u c t i o n
1 For alternative me t ho d s, see Bre s nahan (1982), Cairns (1996), Hy de and Pe r l off (1995),
Iwata (1974), Lau (1982) and Shapiro (1987). For other empirical stud ie s, see Gasmi et al.
(1992), Oliveira Ma r t i ns et al. (1996), Shaffer (1989, 1993) and Swank (1995).2 M o d e l
This chapter describes the model used to determine the degree of col-
lusion. The model (based on Appelbaum, 1982) consists of five equa-
t i o n s. Three demand equations belonging to three production factors
l a b o u r, material and capital. These equations are used to determine
the marginal costs. The fourth equation models demand for the out-
put and gives the price elasticity of demand. A fifth equation is used
to model the firm’s mark-up. The structure of this chapter is as fol-
l ows. The mark-up and its relation to collusion is discussed in sec-
tion  2.1.  Section  2.2  is  about  determining  the  price  elasticity  of
demand. In section 2.3 the marginal costs are discussed. In section
2.4 the link between mark-ups and Lerner-indices will be pre s e n t e d .
Finally in section 2.5 a complete summary of the model is give n .
2 . 1 M a r k - u p
Mark-ups that maximise a company ’s profits depend on the supply
b e h aviour of other companies in the market and on the price elastic-
ity of demand. This can be explained as follows.
Suppose that each company i in market sector j considers what it
supplies to Qi , j as a strategic va r i a b l e. Assume that these are normal
g o o d s, so that the demand for the product from sector j, Qj, will
i n c rease when the price Pj, goes dow n :
( 1 )
w h e re hj is the price elasticity of the demand and . 
The profit (Pi , j) of company i is equal to:
( 2 )
w h e re Cj is the cost function belonging to good j. It is assumed that
all companies have the same cost function. The profit of company i
will be highest with production volume Qi , j, for which the follow i n g
applies: 
( 3 ) .
9
The Degree of Collusion in ConstructionThis equation can be rewritten as follows :
( 4 ) .
Realising conjectural elasticity (qi , j) equals:
( 5 ) .
we rewrite (4):
( 6 ) .
in which MC shows the marginal costs and qi , j equals the conjectur-
al elasticity of the market supply of sector j, related to what compa-
ny i supplies. This elasticity is designated as the degree of collusion.
Equation (6) is called the mark-up or price equation. The model
describes various market forms of price fixing. If q=0, then an indi-
vidual company does not have any effect on market supply. This cor-
responds with perfect competition (or no collusion). If q=1, then the
supply of firm i completely determines the market supply. This cor-
responds to a monopoly position (or full collusion), in practice there
will be one company active in the market. If q = 1/Nj, and Nj e q u a l s
the  number  of  identical  companies  in  market  j,  then  there  is  a
Cournot oligopoly. 
C o n j e c t u ral elasticity and degree of collusion
We shall now discuss why we call the parameter q the degree of col-
lusion (including tacit collusion), while it is actually a conjectura l
e l a s t i c i t y. As we have seen q is defined as:
( 7 ) .
This is the degree to which the extent of total supply will change as
a result of a change in supply by company i, as conjectured by com -
pany i. Thus, each company has a conjecture about the behaviour of
the other companies and uses this conjecture in its profit maximisa-
tion pro c e s s. This type of reasoning would imply that we would esti-
mate only the degree of collusion as conjectured by a company. T h i s
i s,  of  cours e,  not  very  satisfying.  Howeve r,  under  the  plausible
assumption that companies make their conjectures about their riva l ’s
b e h aviour in a rational way (for example based on past ex p e r i e n c e s ) ,
1 0
M o d e lwe can say that the estimated parameter q is the real degree of col-
lusion. As we shall see later, if we choose a cost function of a special
t y p e, namely equal marginal costs for all firms, the estimated para-
meter q is an equilibrium value of the expectations of all individual
companies about the behaviour of the market. This feature means
that we interpret the parameter q as the ave rage degree of collusion
in the industry under study (in this paper Construction).
To clarify the notion of conjectural elasticities, we explain it a little
f u r t h e r. We might rewrite (7) as 
( 8 ) .
w h e re                    the conjectural variation of company i in mar-
ket j, and                , the market share of company i in market j.
N ow we can write the conjectural variation as:                  .
In terms of the reaction of the other companies, we can typify the
various market forms as follows. 
If there is absolute competition, gi = 0 and hence, . 
If there is a Cournot oligopoly ,                      (because for every 
firm the supply of competitors is an exogenous variable) and hence
gi = 1. If all firms have equal size, we obtain qi , j = 1/Nj, where Nj
equals the number of companies in market j.
By looking at the conjectural variations in this way, one might obtain
a better understanding of the notion of conjectural elasticity.
Endogenization of the conjectural elasticity
We assume that the degree of collusion is linked to the market struc-
t u re and market accessibility. For an oligopoly model the influence of
m a r ket structure has been illustrated in the previous para g raph. The
influence of accessibility is found in many earlier studies (see Schere r
and Ro s s, 1990). The presumed connections will be examined by
expanding the model with a specification for q. We will use the fol-
l owing specification: 
1 1
M o d e l( 9 ) .
w h e re c o n c re p resents the market concentration measured by the
s h a re in total employment of the large companies and n e re p re s e n t s
the net entry rate (the re l a t i ve change in the number of companies
c o m p a red to the previous year). It is assumed that collusion incre a-
ses if market concentration rises and if net entry reduces (g1 >0; g2
<0). 
Determining collusion (q) directly by estimating the price equation
(6) is not possible, because price elasticity of demand (h) and mar-
ginal costs (MC) are not known. These problems can be re s o l ved by
adding other equations to the model. This will be explained further
in subsequent sections. 
2 . 2 Price elasticity 
Price  elasticity  of  demand  is  determined  by  using  a  demand
equation. The demand is influenced by price and income: 
( 10 )
Equation (10) is a simple demand equation . P is an aggregate price
i n d ex and Y, an indicator for the actual aggregate demand. Constant
price elasticity (h) and constant income elasticity (r) is assumed.
The market equation is homogenous of the 0t h d e g ree in the prices;
this corresponds to the assumption that there is no money illusion.
In empirical application, the price index and volume of GNP can
re p resent P and Y, re s p e c t i ve l y. 
2 . 3 M a rginal costs
The marginal costs of manufacturing can be determined on the basis
of data about demand for and the price of production factors.1 T h e
assumption here is that production costs can be defined using the
g e n e ralised Leontief cost function, sometimes called the Diewert cost
function. Compared to the normal Leontief cost function, the adva n-
tage of this generalised Leontief cost function is that it allows substi-
tution among the various input factors. The function is defined as fol-
l ows: 
1 2
M o d e l
1 B e s ides this para me t r ic approach to ma rg i nal costs, the re is also a no n - p a ra me t r ic appro a c h :
see Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995)( 11 )
w h e re :
C ( w, q ) total costs;
w the price vector of the inputs: capital K, labour L and
material M;
q manufacturing vo l u m e ;
r, s indices for the input factors K, L and M.
This cost function assumes that brs = bs r, the crosswise coefficients,
a re equal. Fu r t h e r, the cost function is homogenous in the input pri-
ces w: C(w, q ) = w C ( 1 , q ) .
The coefficients of the cost function can be determined by factor
demand equations. These factor demand equations follow from the
cost function via Shephard ’s lemma. If the cost function is differe n-
tiable in w and in q, and wr>0 for r = K, L, M, then the condition-
al factor demand function for input r, xr( w,q), is equal to 
( 1 2 )
for r = K, L, M.
Based on the generalised Leontief cost function, the conditional fac-
tor demand of input r is equal to: 
( 1 3 )
Estimating these demand-equations gives the coefficients of the cost
function and of the marginal cost function. The marginal cost func-
tion belonging to a generalised Leontief cost function is re p re s e n t e d
by: 
( 1 4 )
2 . 4 Mark-up and Lerner index
If we have determined the marginal costs and the price elasticity, we
can go back to equation (6) and determine the Lerner index for the
industry under study. If we abstract from company-specific marg i n a l
costs and conjectural elasticities (as we will do later), we can write
the mark-up equation (6) as 
( 1 5 ) j = sector index .
1 3
M o d e lThe Lerner index, which determines the profit margin, is defined as
(16) 
By combining (14) and (15) we can define the Lerner index in terms
of the degree of collusion q and the price elasticity h: 
(17) 
The Lerner index (also called the degree of oligopoly power) can be
split up into the behaviour of companies (q) and the behaviour of
c o n s u m e rs (h). As can be seen from (16), the Lerner index will, in
g e n e ral, lie in the interval between zero and one, because MC are
p o s i t i ve and MC will normally be lower than output price.
2 . 5 The model to be estimated
Individual data and aggregate data
The total model consists of  five equations: the conditional factor
demand equations for capital, labour and material (see (12)), the
demand equation (10) and the price equation (combination of (6)
and (14) ). Howeve r, when we write down these five equations to
form the full model, we are not yet able to estimate the model since
we have aggregate data and no firm data (see the next chapter for a
description of the available data). Since the model was derivated at
firm level (that is, the factor demand equations and the price equa-
tion we re derived at firm level and the demand equation at sector
l evel),  we  must  check  whether  our  cost  function  (11)  is  of  the
‘Gorman polar form’. This is a condition through which equations
that we re derived for firm variables also apply for aggregate industry
va r i a b l e s. In broad lines, it means that marginal costs must be con-
stant and equal across firms (see Gorman (1953) for details). Note
that this does not mean that different firms must all have the same
cost curve s, but only that the cost curves of different firms are all lin-
ear and parallel. When we look at (14) we see that the genera l i z e d
Leontief cost function is indeed of the Gorman polar form, since the
input prices are exogenous to the individual firm (this is an impor-
tant condition for applying Shephard ’s lemma). 
An implication of using aggregate data is that also the parameter q
becomes a value at sector level. Thus, the estimated q is the ave ra g e
collusion in an industry. Howeve r, it is important to realise that if we
s h o u l d h ave firm data and we chose cost function of the Gorman
1 4
M o d e lpolar form, the estimated q would still be a parameter estimated at
the sectoral level. This can be seen as follows. Re m e m b e r, we could
write the price equation derived at firm level as:
( 1 8 ) i = company index,  j = sector index
T h u s, the marginal costs and the conjectural elasticity are company -
specific whereas the output price and the price elasticity of demand
a re sector-specific. If we choose a cost function of the Gorman polar
form, the marginal costs are the same for all firms so the marg i n a l
costs are no longer company-specific only, but also sector-specific.
As a result of this, the conjectural elasticity that is estimated is also
an elasticity at sector level. It is important to realise that the estimat-
ed q is an equilibrium value of the conjectural elasticity (because it
f o l l ows from the first order condition of the profit maximisation of
the companies). Hence we do not assume that all companies always
h ave the same expectations about their riva l ’s behav i o u r. 
Other cost function
As we have seen, if we choose the cost function of the Gorman polar
form, we obtain an estimate of q at the sectoral level, even if we have
firm data at our disposal. There are also cost functions which can
estimate company-specific conjectural elasticities. We would like to
mention one that was developed by Diewert and Wa l e s :
( 1 9 )
w h e re :
C ( w, q , t ) total costs;
w the price vector of the inputs, capital K, labour L and
material M;
q manufacturing vo l u m e ;
t time index ;
r, s indices for the input factors K, L and M.
The values of ar, br and gr a re determined exogenously by the re s e a r-
cher (Diewert and Wa l e s, 1987, page 49). An attra c t i ve feature of this
model is that technological change is also captured by the cost func-
tion. As can be seen, marginal costs will not be equal for firms and
hence company-specific values of q could be found (at least in theo-
ry) when firm data are ava i l a b l e. Disadvantage of such a specifica-
tion is that the number of para m e t e rs to be estimated becomes larg e.
Fu r t h e r m o re, one could pose the question whether one is really inte-
1 5
M o d e lrested in firm-specific conjectural elasticities. Probably not. For poli-
cy purposes it is much more interesting to learn something about the
ave rage value of the conjectural elasticity in a certain industry. In
that case one may interpret the conjectural elasticity as the ave ra g e
d e g ree of collusion in the industry. 
For all these re a s o n s, we think it is (a) reasonable (choice) to choo-
se a cost function of the Gorman polar form. As it becomes ev i d e n t ,
in practice also the assumption of constant marginal costs acro s s
firms is a very plausible one, since a detailed study on statistical cost
functions showed that ‘more often than not’ constant marginal costs
we re  the  best  pattern  to  describe  the  data  in  various  studies
(Johnston, 1960, page 168).
Complete model
N ow we are ready to write down the complete model. There are two
distinct va r i a n t s. In the first variant, designated as model 1, the deg-
ree of collusion is shown through parameter q. In the second va r i a n t ,
designated as model 2, the degree of collusion is specified as a func-
tion of variables that describe market structure and market accessi-
bility (conform equation (9)). 






M o d e lIn the models q3 - d i g denotes the output at the three-digit industry
g roup level, whereas q denotes output at the three-digit level per size
c l a s s, which is the furthest level of desaggregation for which we have
data. More details on the data will be discussed in the next chapter1.
1 7
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1 Note that, in the de ma nd equa t ion, the cons t a nt term is indu s t r y - s p e c i f ic. It is easy to see
w hy this is ne c e s s a r y. The prices at sector level and aggregate level both equal one in the
base year. Also the ind icator for aggregate de ma nd is the same for all groups in every year.
W i t hout sector-specific cons t a nts this would imply that the output volume is the same for all
i ndustry groups in the base year.3 Data and estimation technique
This chapter describes the data and estimation technique used to
estimate models 1 and 2.
3 . 1 D a t a
We use data for the ye a rs 1983 up to and including 1993. The data
a re  mainly  derived  from  Construction  Statistics  (see  CBS,
‘ S a m e n vattend overzicht Bouwnijverheid, 1993’). The data are ava i l-
able for five three-digit groups and three (SBI 511 and 512) or two
(SBI 513, 514, 519) category sizes. The number of major sector cate-
gories is twe l ve. The number of observations equals 12*11=132. SBI
means  standard  industrial  classification  and  is  used  by  Statistics
Netherlands (CBS). The three-digit groups 511, 512, 513, 514 and 51 9
refer to the following construction sectors :
511 : Construction of residential and non-residential buildings
51 2 : Civil engineering: land, water and road construction 
51 3 : Painting, glazing of buildings and decora t i n g
51 4 : P l a s t e re rs
51 9 : Other types of building completion wo r k .
For the general comprehension of the model we mention whether the
various variables are ‘micro’, ‘meso’ or ‘macro ’. The variables xL, xM,
xK and q (the factor demand volumes and the output volume) are all
on the micro - l evel, since these variables appear in the cost function
which is per definition given at firm level. By ‘micro’ we mean in this
case the level of a three-digit group per size class. The variables wL,
wM, wK, q3 - d i g, p (the factor prices, the output for a three-digit gro u p
and the output price) and the variables market concentration and net
entry are all on the meso-level. For the factor prices, this is because
of the assumption that these prices must be exogenous to the indivi-
dual firm, for the variables q3 - d i g and p because the output equation
is derived at sector level and for the other two variables mentioned
because of the fact that the degree of collusion which they mean to
explain is at the sectoral level. By ‘meso’ we mean at the level of a
t h ree-digit industry group (independent of size class; an exception is
the variable wL which does vary per size class, howeve r, this does
not contradict the assumption of exogenous wages for the individu-
al firm). Finally we have two variables at the macro level: P and GNP.
GNP is measured in current prices. P is used to standardize the meso
outputprice (p). p/P is the re l a t i ve price with respect to the price at
m a c ro - l evel. Of course P is also used to deflate GNP. The macro - l eve l
is here the level of the economy. The assumption that is made here,
is  that  consumers  choose  between  spending  their  money  on
1 9
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their  money  outside  the  Construction  industry.  Alternatively  we
could choose the macro level to be Construction as a whole (and take
a g g regate price and aggregate demand at the level of the 1-digit sec-
tor for the Construction). In that case we would assume that consu-
m e rs choose between spending their money in a specific thre e - d i g i t
industry group in Construction or spending their money somew h e re
else in Construction. Since we think that the first alternative is most
re a l i s t i c, we have chosen the macro level to be the whole economy.
3 . 2 Estimation technique
Since models 1 and 2 are simultaneous, fully specified models, we
p refer  to  estimate  the  models  using  Full  Information  Maximum
L i kelihood (FIML).
2 0
Data and estimation technique4 Re s u l t s
In  this  section  we  shall  discuss  the  estimation  results  for  the
Construction sector.  In  the first  part we shall concentrate  on the
p a ra m e t e rs in which we are most interested, price and income elas-
t i c i t y, degree of collusion and degree of oligopoly powe r. In the sec-
ond part of this section we shall discuss the estimates of the coeffi-
cients of the cost functions.
4 . 1 Price elasticity and degree of collusion
By combining observations from the different three-digit groups in
the estimation sample, we obtain a price elasticity and degree of col-
lusion for Construction. In model 1 we assume that these para m e t e rs
a re constant across different three-digit groups and across differe n t
ye a rs. In model 2 we allow for different values of q for different thre e -
digit groups and for different ye a rs by endogenizing the degree of col-
lusion (conform equation (9)). The estimation results are pre s e n t e d
in table 1. The first column contains the results of model 1 while the
second column contains the results of model 2. Because net entry is
not significant in model 2, we re-estimated the model without net
e n t r y. The results of this specification are presented in the last col-
umn. We see that the results become much better in terms of signif-
icance of the para m e t e rs if net entry is excluded. There f o re, as far as
model 2 is concerned, we shall focus on the specification without net
entry from now on. 
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The Degree of Collusion in ConstructionLooking at the re s u l t s, we see that the price elasticity of demand is
about -0.90, which is a plausible value at sector level. The income
elasticity also (parameter r in (20) and (21)) has a plausible va l u e,
namely around one. This increases our confidence in the re l i a b i l i t y
of the rest of the parameter estimates. The degree of collusion q, eva l-
uated for the whole of the Construction, has a value of 0.034 in
model 1 (static specification) and a value of 0.054 in model 2 (cal-
culated for the sample mean). As a value of zero corresponds with
full competition and a value of 1 corresponds with monopoly, we
conclude there f o re that, although significantly different from zero ,
the degree of collusion in the Construction is not very larg e. Because
of that, and the fact that the price elasticity is not too low in the
absolute sense (-0.90 as said before), neither is the degree of oligop-
oly power as measured by the Lerner-index is very larg e, namely
0 . 0 61 in the dynamic model1. 
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Table 1   E s t i mates for the Cons t r uc t ion (1983-1993)*
Mo del 2 with net entry 
Mo del 1 as ex p l a natory varia b l e Mo del 2 without net ent r y
Output equation
P r ice elastic i t y - 0 . 9 1 - 0 . 3 6 - 0 . 8 8
( 0 . 3 6 ) ( 0 . 5 0 ) ( 0 . 3 3 )
I nc o me elastic i t y 1 . 0 5 0 . 8 6 1 . 0 7
( 0 . 0 8 5 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 7 7 )
Price equation
C o ns t a nt - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 . 0 5 4
( 0 . 0 3 8 ) ( 0 . 0 2 8 )
Ma r ket conc e nt ra t io n 0 . 1 1 0 . 2 4
( s h a re of GB) ( 0 . 1 5 ) ( 0 . 1 0 )
Net entry curve 0 . 0 3 5
( 0 . 0 8 2 )
D e g ree of collusio n 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 2 1 * * 0 . 0 5 4 * *
( 0 . 0 1 5 ) ( 0 . 0 3 0 ) ( 0 . 0 2 1 )
L e r ner index 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 5 9 * * 0 . 0 6 1 * *
( 0 . 0 0 8 7 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 2 ) ( 0 . 0 0 8 4 )
Number of observatio ns 1 3 2 1 2 0 1 3 2
* S t a nda rd errors in pare nt he s e s.
* * E v a l uated at sample me a n .
1 T he same result has been fo u nd by Ma r t i ns, Scarpetta and Pilatfo u nd (OECD, 1996). They have
e s t i mated mark-ups for fifteen OECD-count r ies divided in eig ht sectors. They used Roege r ’ s
me t hod  to  de t e r m i ne  ma r k - u p s.  Lerne r - i ndex  can  be  calculated  (from  mark-up):  ma r k -
u p = 1 / ( 1 - L e r ne r ) .An interesting feature of the estimation results is the fact that the
coefficient of the market concentration is significantly positive. More
s p e c i f i c a l l y, equation (9) re a d s :
q =  -0.05 + 0.24 c o n c
q: d e g ree of collusion (between 0 and 1)
c o n c: m a r ket concentration = market share of large companies
( b e t ween 0 and 1)
Note that with the present market share of large companies being
about 46% the present degree of collusion is about 0.05. With this
equation policy effects can be evaluated. For example: if, due to cer-
tain policy measure s, the share of large companies could be re d u c e d
by 10 percent point (to 36%), equation (9) predicts that this wo u l d
l ower the degree of collusion by 0.024 (to about 0.026). We may con-
clude that market concentration is an interesting variable for gov-
ernment to monitor.
D i f f e rences between industry gro u p s
For model 2 (with dynamic sector q’s) we also want to present a
table with predicted values of the degree of collusion, based on the
p a rameter estimates and the values of the variable market concen-
t ration. In this way we can detect differences in the degree of collu-
sion between the different three-digit groups and we can also detect
d evelopments in time of the degree of collusion.
Table 2  P re d icted values of de g ree of collusio n
y e a r SBI 511 SBI 512 SBI 513 SBI 514 SBI 519
1 9 8 3 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 4 8 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 0 7 7 0 . 0 6 2
1 9 8 4 0 . 0 1 4 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 0 7 0 0 . 0 7 7
1 9 8 5 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 4 0 0 . 0 8 9 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 0 3 8
1 9 8 6 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 8 7 0 . 0 6 2 0 . 0 4 1
1 9 8 7 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 4 2 0 . 0 8 8 0 . 0 7 8 0 . 0 4 5
1 9 8 8 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 9 1 0 . 0 8 7 0 . 0 5 7
1 9 8 9 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 4 0 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 0 6 5
1 9 9 0 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 0 6 6
1 9 9 1 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 5 1 0 . 1 0 0 0 . 1 0 3 0 . 0 7 7
1 9 9 2 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 5 3 0 . 1 0 8 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 0 8 8
1 9 9 3 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 5 3 0 . 1 0 2 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 0 7 2
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R e s u l t sThe three-digit groups 511, 512, 513, 514 and 519 refer to the follow-
ing construction sectors :
511 : Construction of residential and non-residential buildings
51 2 : Civil engineering: land, water and road construction 
51 3 : Painting, glazing of buildings and decora t i n g
51 4 : P l a s t e re rs
51 9 : Other types of building completion wo r k .
The general picture of the development in time is that, from 1983
o nwa rd s, the degree of collusion is decreased until 1987. From this
year onwa rd s, the degree of collusion increased. In 1993 finally, there
was again a slight fall in the degree of collusion.
When we look at the various three-digit gro u p s, we see that the
d e g ree of collusion for the three-digit groups with SBI-codes 513, 51 4
and  519  is  higher  than  for  those  with  SBI-codes  511  and  51 2 .
P ro b a b l y, this is due to the fact that the variable which serves as an
indicator of market concentration is measured in a different way. Fo r
the industries with SBI-codes 511 and 512, this variable is measure d
as the employment share in the total industry group of companies
with h u n d re d or more employe e s, while for the other industries, the
variable is measured as the employment share of companies with ten
or more employe e s. This distinction was made because companies in
the latter three industries are, in general, much smaller than compa-
nies in  the  industries  with  SBI-codes  511  and  512.  Howeve r, the
change in definition that was made for that reason, has probably led
to values for market concentration in the industries with SBI-codes
513, 514 and 519 which are not completely comparable with those of
the other industries. Howeve r, when we look at the table, it seems
justified to conclude that the degree of collusion in the construction
of buildings is smaller than the degree of collusion in the rest of the
construction sector.
4 . 2 The cost function
The methods that we have used for determining the degree of collu-
sion and the price elasticity of demand enable us to specify a full cost
function. We specified the following type of cost function.
( 21 )
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R e s u l t sw h e re :
C ( w, q ) total costs;
w the price vector of the inputs: capital K, labour L and mate-
rial M;
q manufacturing vo l u m e ;
r, s indices for the input factors K, L and M.
We assume that brs = bs r, the crosswise coefficients, are equal. Now,
we can rewrite (21) as follows.
( 2 2 )
In table 3, we report the estimated para m e t e rs of the cost function
for the models 1 and 2 (without net entry as explanatory va r i a b l e ) .
Table 3   E s t i mated cost func t ion for Cons t r uc t ion (1983-1993)*
Mo del 1 Mo del 2 without net ent r y
bL L 0 . 0 5 9 - 0 . 3 8
( 0 . 0 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 7 9 )
bM M 0 . 1 2 - 0 . 4 1
( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 0 9 3 )
bK K 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 4 7
( 0 . 0 5 4 ) ( 0 . 0 5 0 )
bL M 0 . 3 3 0 . 7 8
( 0 . 0 7 9 ) ( 0 . 0 7 4 )
bL K - 0 . 0 7 0 - 0 . 0 2 4
( 0 . 0 3 9 ) ( 0 . 0 2 7 )
bM K 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 0 3 6
( 0 . 0 5 4 ) ( 0 . 0 5 0 )
bL 2 4 . 7 1 4 . 3
( 4 . 9 1 ) ( 4 . 4 6 )
bM - 2 8 . 5 - 1 2 . 5
( 5 . 4 0 ) ( 4 . 0 6 )
bK - 9 . 7 0 - 9 . 0 7
( 2 . 2 0 ) ( 2 . 2 5 )
Number of observatio ns 1 3 2 1 3 2
* Standa rd errors in pare nt he s e s.
We shall analyse the estimated para m e t e rs of the cost function of
model 2 (the right column of table 3). At first sight, some para m e t e rs
seem to have the ‘wrong’ sign. For exa m p l e, the para m e t e rs bM a n d
bK h ave negative signs. It is not a plausible result that higher input
prices would lead to lower total costs for a firm. But, as it turns out,
this is not the case. This is because the variables wM and wK appear
at more places than one in the cost function. In order to obtain an
idea of the impact on total costs of a certain rise in an input price,
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R e s u l t sone must take into account the total effect in the cost function of this
higher input price. This can be done by computing total costs with
and without the price change imposed while holding all other va r i-
ables  constant.  Obviously,  the  difference  between  the  figure s
obtained is equal to the total impact.
To get an idea of the magnitude of these impacts, we shall report the
impacts of a 0.01-change in input prices for the sample ave rage va l-
ues of the variables wL, wM, wK and q in table 4 (the change of 0.01
c o r responds to 1 percent of the input price in the base year 1983).
The left part of the table shows the sample ave rages and the right
part of the table shows the impact on total costs of a 0.01-change in
one of the input prices, assuming sample ave rage values for input
prices and produced quantity. The prices of inputs and output are
scaled on one in the base year 1983. Quantities of inputs and output
a re  in  millions  (constant  price guilders).  Hence costs (in  curre n t
prices) are also in millions.
Table 4 Impacts on total costs of a 0.01-change in input pric e s
Va r ia b l e Sample avera ge Input fa c t o r I m p a c t
wL 1 . 3 1 l a b o u r 9 . 4
wM 1 . 1 1 ma t e r ia l 1 3 . 8
wK 1 . 1 4 c a p i t a l 1 . 6
q 2 9 5 6 . 5
* The mo del is mo del 2, without net ent r y.
We see that the 0.01-rise in the price of labour leads to a rise in total
costs of 9.4 millions of Dutch guilders for an ‘ave rage’ combination
industry-size class. What is more interesting, howeve r, is to look at
the  differences  between  the  magnitudes  of  the  impacts  of  price
changes of the different inputs. We see that total costs are much
m o re sensitive to changes in material prices and labour prices than
to capital prices: the impacts of price changes in material and labour
a re more than 5 times as great as the impact of a price change in cap-
i t a l1. Notice that we can also see this (roughly) by looking at the
p a ra m e t e rs bL M, bL K and bM K, since the terms of these para m e t e rs
h ave the highest order of magnitude in the cost function. Because
bL M has a much higher value than bL K and bM K, labour and material
p l ay a much greater role in the determination of total costs than cap-
ital does.
1 Of course, this is just a re f l e c t ion of the fact that the cost shares of ma t e r ial and labour are
much larger than the cost share of capital in the cons t r uc t ion sector. Ho w e v e r, the fact that
we actually find this on the basis of our cost func t ion gives us an ind ic a t ion that the esti-
mated cost func t ion behaves well.
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A possible drawback of the cost function that we have used is the
fact that it does not capture technological change. In order to check
whether the results differ when we allow for technological change,
we also estimate the model for a cost function that d o e s a l l ow for
technological  change.  For  this  purpose,  we  choose  a  simplified
D i ewert and Wales cost function (compare with (18)):
( 2 3 )
w h e re :
C ( w, q , t ) total costs;
w the price vector of the inputs, capital K, labour L and mate-
rial M;
q manufacturing vo l u m e ;
t time index ;
r, s indices for the input factors K, L and M.
One of the reasons that we choose this function instead of the full
D i ewert and Wales is the fact that the values of the constants ar, br
and gr a re determined exogenously by the re s e a rc h e r, as mentioned
in section 2.3. Although Diewert and Wales give a couple of specific,
well considered choices for these constants, such choices are still
liable to a certain degree of arbitra r i n e s s. We think this is not a ve r y
s t rong property of a cost function. Another reason to deviate from the
full Diewert and Wales function is the fact that, if we should use the
full Diewert and Wales function, this would not be a cost function of
the Gorman polar form, since marginal costs are then different acro s s
f i r m s. Because we use aggregate data, such a cost function might not
be used. Now, with the cost function (23), technological change is
c a p t u red by the last term. As time goes by, we expect that total costs
diminish because of technological change. Thus, we expect the para-
m e t e rs bL t, bM t and bK t to have a negative sign. As can be seen fro m
(23), it is assumed that the effects of technological developments are
g reater when firms produce more output or when input prices are
h i g h e r.
The estimation results of model 2 (dynamic degree of collusion) are
s h own in tables 4a (main para m e t e rs) and 4b (para m e t e rs of cost
function). In order to facilitate comparison between both specifica-
t i o n s, the estimation results of model 2 with cost functions (10) and
(23) are shown next to each other.
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R e s u l t sTable 4a   E s t i mates for Cons t r uc t ion (1983-1993) for differe nt cost func-
t io ns *
Mo del 2  Mo del 2 with cost func t ion (23) 
with cost func t ion (10) ( a l l o w i ng for techno l o g ical change )
Output equation
P r ice elastic i t y - 0 . 8 8 - 0 . 8 6
( 0 . 3 3 ) ( 0 . 3 7 )
I nc o me elastic i t y 1 . 0 7 1 . 1 7
( 0 . 0 7 7 ) ( 0 . 1 2 )
Price equation
C o ns t a nt - 0 . 0 5 4 - 0 . 0 5 9
( 0 . 0 2 8 ) ( 0 . 0 5 7 )
Ma r ket conc e nt ra t io n 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 5
( s h a re of GB) ( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 5 )
D e g ree of collusio n 0 . 0 5 4 * * 0 . 0 5 3 * *
( 0 . 0 2 1 ) ( 0 . 0 2 4 )
L e r ner index 0 . 0 6 1 * * 0 . 0 6 2 * *
( 0 . 0 0 8 4 ) ( 0 . 0 1 7 )
Number of observatio ns 1 3 2 1 3 2
L o g l i ke l i ho o d 1 0 9 1 . 8 1 0 9 8 . 1
* S t a nda rd errors in pare nt he s e s.
* * E v a l uated at sample me a n .
Table 4b   E s t i mated cost func t io ns for Cons t r uc t ion (1983-1993)*
Mo del 2  Mo del 2 with cost func t ion (23) 
with cost func t ion (10) ( a l l o w i ng for techno l o g ical change )
bL L - 0 . 3 8 - 0 . 3 9
( 0 . 0 7 9 ) ( 0 . 1 3 )
bM M - 0 . 4 1 - 0 . 4 1
( 0 . 0 9 3 ) ( 0 . 1 8 )
bK K 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 0 4 5
( 0 . 0 5 0 ) ( 0 . 0 5 9 )
bL M 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 0
( 0 . 0 7 4 ) ( 0 . 1 3 )
bL K - 0 . 0 2 4 - 0 . 0 2 0
( 0 . 0 2 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 1 )
bM K 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 0 3 6
( 0 . 0 5 0 ) ( 0 . 0 8 4 )
bL 1 4 . 3 1 3 . 0
( 4 . 4 6 ) ( 6 . 4 2 )
bM - 1 2 . 5 - 1 1 . 4
( 4 . 0 6 ) ( 5 . 9 8 ) )
bK - 9 . 0 7 - 9 . 0 3
( 2 . 2 5 ) ( 3 . 1 8 )
bL t - 0 . 0 0 1 1
( 0 . 0 0 2 2 )
bM t - 0 . 0 0 3 0
( 0 . 0 0 2 8 )
bK t - 0 . 0 0 0 4 9
( 0 . 0 0 0 9 0 )
Number of observatio ns 1 3 2 1 3 2
L o g l i ke l i ho o d 1 0 9 1 . 8 1 0 9 8 . 1
* Standa rd errors in pare nt he s e s.
When we look at table 4a, we see that the main parameter estimates
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R e s u l t sremain roughly the same when we include technology in the cost
function. This also holds for the para m e t e rs of  the cost function
(table 4b). When we apply a formal likelihood ratio test, we conclude
that the specifications are significantly different: two times the dif-
f e rence in loglikelihood value (which is 12.6 in our case) is bigger
than the critical value of a c2 distribution with 3 degrees of fre e d o m
( 7 . 81 at 5% significance level). Howeve r, since the parameter esti-
mates do not differ much between both models and since the para-
m e t e rs of the technology para m e t e rs bL t, bM t and bK t a re not signif-
icant, we conclude that for the construction sector, it is not a pro b-
lem to exclude technological change from the cost function.
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L i t e r a t u r eAppendix:  Data description
This appendix shows the industry gro u p s, category sizes and ye a rs for which data are ava i-
l a b l e. Fu r t h e r, there is a description of the definitions of the various variables from the
model. 
Description of Sectors
The data for the Construction Sector (1983-1993) refer to the industry groups mentioned
b e l ow. 
S B I - c o d e D e s c r i p t i o n
511 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings
51 2 Civil engineering: land, water and road construction 
51 3 Painting, glazing of buildings and decora t i n g
51 4 P l a s t e re rs
51 9 Other types of building completion wo r k
Definition of Va r i a b l e s
The variables from the model have been constructed as follows. Variables marked with an
* are presumed to be independent of category size.
1 . Variable xL: the quantity of labour (input). This consists of the number of employe e s
at the end of September, in thousands of pers o n s.
2 . Variable wL: the price of labour. This is the total labour cost divided by the number
of employees (see 1.). Unit: thousands of Dutch guilders. 
3 . Variable xM: the quantity of material (input). This is the consumer value (=manu-
facturing purchases less stock transactions of raw materials plus energy use plus
other operating costs) divided by wM (see 4.). Unit: millions of Dutch guilders (con-
stant price leve l ) .
4 . Variable wM *: the price of material. Here, different price developments we re used
f rom the CBS publications ‘Monthly Price Statistics’ and ‘National Accounts’ for the
various industry gro u p s, 511 – 519 (units are indexe s ) :
511: building materials, pottery and glass industries (manufacture r ’s prices)
512: steel tubing (manufacture r ’s price)
513: paint and wallpaper (consumer price)
514: cement and lime products (manufacture r ’s price)
519: the same as 511
5.  Variable xK: the amount of capital (input), see wK.
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the construction of these variables is mutually coherent. The basis is laid for the data
of investments in tangible assets at three-digit level for 1980-1992 from the CBS publi-
cation ‘Statistics of Investments in Tangible Assets in Trade and Industry’. These
i n vestment figures are subdivided into types of goods. Using growth curves based on
i n vestment figures for the entire economy (source: ‘National Accounts’), these series
h ave been expanded to 1963-1993. By dividing these series by the related inve s t m e n t
prices and then making use of volume changes in investments of tangible assets for
1948-1993 (source: ‘National Accounts’), we obtain a series per type of goods in con-
stant prices for 1948-1993. We can now calculate the value of the capital goods stock
per type of goods as follows (we are assuming exponential depreciation):                 
(35 is a cut-off point for infinity). The depreciation fraction di is calculated as the re c i-
p rocal concepts of the ave rage life ex p e c t a n cy for the type of goods concerned. The
ave rage (empirical) life ex p e c t a n cy is taken from the ‘Life Expectancy Data Bank’ of
the Main Department of Capital Goods Stocks and Balances Statistics of the CBS. This
t h e re f o re provides a capital goods stock in constant prices per type of asset for the
ye a rs 1983-1993. Howeve r, we are looking for a single capital goods stock (not per
type of asset) and the capital goods stocks cannot simply be a sum over the type of
a s s e t s, since they are ex p ressed in constant prices. There f o re, we multiply the vo l u-
me component per type of asset by the price component (the consumer price) to
obtain the consumer value per type of asset, for which the sum can then be found.
For the consumer price per type of asset i at time t, ci , t, the following calculation must
be made: ci , t = (rt + di) pi , t - D pi , t (cost of financing and depreciation less capital
gain). Here, r is the long-term interest plus 2 percent (surc h a rge for business risks.
The long-term interest comes from the CPB publication ‘Central Economic Plan’), and
for di again the re c i p rocal concepts of ave rage life ex p e c t a n cy. The symbol p again
re p resents the investment price. We shall now multiply the capital goods stock per
type of asset in constant prices by the consumer price. This produces the consumer
cost of capital per type of asset in current prices, C. We shall now weight consumer
prices c with consumer costs C per type of asset in order to arrive at a single consu-
mer price wK. Unit: percentage points. Afterwa rds we shall add up the consumer
costs of various types of assets to arrive at the total consumer cost. We then divide
this by the deriva t i ve wK to obtain the volume component xK. Finally, the va r i a b l e
xK is distributed over the category sizes proportionate to energy use. Unit: millions of
Dutch guilders, constant price level. 
7.  Variable q: the quantity of production (output). This is based on the sum of the pro-
duction va l u e, the trading margin attained and revenues from other, non-industrial
a c t i v i t i e s. The production value is the sum of stock-transaction production, sales,
export refunds and remittances for industrial damage. The variable constructed in
this way can there f o re be seen as the sum of income from industrial activities and
income from other activities. Of this total income, payments to subcontra c t o rs have
been deducted since these do not re p resent the companies’ own production. Finally,
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Appendix:  Data descriptionsince the variable q re p resents a quantity and not a va l u e, there will be a subsequent
c o r rection for the selling price p (see 8). The variable q is ex p ressed in millions of
Dutch guilders (constant price level). 
8.  Variable q3 - d i g *: the quantity of production in a three-digit industry group (output).
This is the variable q, summated over the category sizes.
9.  Variable p *: the production price in one’s own industry group (selling price). These
price developments come from the ‘National Ac c o u n t s ’. Industry groups 511 and 51 2
we re ava i l a b l e. The price development used for industry groups 513, 514 and 519 is
that of the item ‘normal maintenance and other activities’. Unit: index .
10.  Variable P *: the production price of the entire economy (selling price). For this pur-
p o s e, price development of domestic product against net market prices was used
( s o u rce: ‘National Accounts’). Unit: index .
11.  Variable GNP *: aggregate demand of the entire economy. For this purpose, domes-
tic product in market prices was used (source: ‘National Accounts’). The variable is
used in constant prices GNP/P, ex p ressed as a volume index .
12.  Variable conc *: employment share ‘wholesale industry’. For industry groups 511 and
512, this re p resents the number of staff in companies with 100 or more employe e s,
divided by the total number of employees in the industry group. Industry groups 51 3 ,
514 and 519 invo l ve the number of staff in companies with ten or more employe e s,
divided by the total number of employees in the industry group. 
13.  Variable ne *: net entry curve. This is calculated as the re l a t i ve change in the num-
ber of companies compared to the previous ye a r. Unit: percentual change.
In order to make the estimated para m e t e rs of the cost function easier to interpret, the units
of the prices of labour and capital, as described earlier, have been adapted to index figu-
res for the estimations. This implies that the units of the quantities of labour and capital
h ave also been adapted (namely such that the product of price and quantity re m a i n s
unchanged). Now, all prices are ex p ressed in index figures and volumes are in terms of
m i l l i o n s.
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Appendix:  Data descriptionList of Re s e a rch Re p o r t s
The re s e a rch report series is the successor of both the re s e a rch paper and the ‘re s e a rc h-
p u b l i katie’ series. There is a consecutive report numbering followed by /x. For /x there are
f i ve options:
/ E : a report of the department of Strategic Re s e a rch, written in English;
/ N : l i ke /E, but written in Dutch;
/ F : l i ke /E, but written in Fre n c h ;
/ A : a report of one of the other departments of the Re s e a rch Institute for Small and
Medium-sized Business;
/ I : a report of the department of Strategic Re s e a rch for internal purposes; ex t e r n a l
availability on re q u e s t .
9 301 / E The intertemporal stability of the concentra t i o n - m a rgins relationship in Dutch
and U.S. manufacturing; Yvonne Prince and Roy Thurik
9 302 / E Pe rsistence  of  profits  and  competitiveness  in  Dutch  manufacturing;  Aad
K l e i j we g
9 303 / E Small store presence in Japan; Martin A. Carre e, Jeroen C.A. Potjes and A. Roy
T h u r i k
9 30 4 / I Multi-factorial risk analysis and the sensitivity concept; Erik M. Vermeulen, Jaap
S p ronk and Nico van der Wijst
9 305 / E Do small firms’ price-cost margins follow those of large firms? First empirical
results; Yvonne Prince and Roy Thurik
9 30 6 / A Export success of SMEs: an empirical study; Cinzia Mancini and Yvonne Prince
9 307 / N Het aandeel van het midden- en kleinbedrijf in de Nederlandse industrie; Ke e s
B a k ker en Roy Thurik
9 30 8 / E Multi-factorial risk analysis applied to firm evaluation; Erik M. Vermeulen, Jaap
S p ronk and Nico van der Wijst
9 30 9 / E Visualizing interfirm comparison; Erik M. Vermeulen, Jaap Spronk and Nico
van der Wijst
9 310 / E Industry dynamics and small firm development in the European printing indus-
try (Case Studies of Britain, The Netherlands and Denmark); Michael Kitson,
Yvonne Prince and Mette Mönsted
9 4 01 / E E m p l oyment during the business cycle: evidence from Dutch manufacturing;
M a rcel H.C. Lever en Wilbert H.M. van der Hoeve n
9 4 02 / N De Nederlandse industrie in internationaal perspectief: arbeidspro d u k t i v i t e i t ,
lonen en concurrentiepositie; Aad Kleijweg en Sjaak Vo l l e b re g t
9 4 03 / E A micro-econometric analysis of interrelated factor demand; René Huigen, Aad
K l e i j weg, George van Leeuwen and Kees Zeelenberg
9 4 0 4 / E B e t ween economies of scale and entre p re n e u rship; Roy Thurik
9 4 05 / F L’ é volution structurelle du commerce de gros français; Luuk Klomp et Eugène
Re b e rs
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The Degree of Collusion in Construction9 4 0 6 / I B a s i s i n komen: een inventarisatie van argumenten; Bob van Dijk
9 4 07 / E Interfirm performance evaluation under uncertainty, a multi-dimensional fra m e -
work; Jaap Spronk and Erik M. Ve r m e u l e n
9 4 0 8 / N I n d i c a t o ren voor de dynamiek van de Nederlandse economie: een sectorale ana-
l yse; Garmt Dijksterhuis, Hendrik-Jan Heeres en Aad Kleijwe g
9 4 0 9 / E Entry and exit in Dutch manufacturing industries; Aad Kleijweg en Marcel Leve r
9 410 / I Labour productivity in Europe: differences in firm-size, countries and industries;
Garmt Dijksterhuis
9 411 / N Ve rslag van de derde mondiale workshop Small Business Economics; Tinberg e n
Instituut, Ro t t e rdam, 26-27 augustus 1994; M.A. Carree en M.H.C. Leve r
9 41 2 / E Internal  and  external  forces in  sectoral  wage  formation:  evidence  from the
Netherlands; Johan J. Graafland and Marcel H.C. Leve r
9 41 3 / A Selectie van leve ra n c i e rs: een kwestie van produkt, profijt en partnerschap?; F.
P l e i j s t e r
9 41 4 / I G rafische we e rg ave van tabellen; Garmt Dijksterhuis
9 501 / N O ver de toepassing van de financieringstheorie in het midden- en kleinbedrijf;
Erik M. Ve r m e u l e n
9 502 / E Insider powe r, market powe r, firm size and wages: evidence from Dutch manu-
facturing industries; Marcel H.C. Lever and Jolanda M. van We r k h o ove n
9 503 / E Export performance of SMEs; Yvonne M. Prince
9 50 4 / E S t rategic Niches and Profitability: A First Report; David B. Au d retsch, Yvonne M.
Prince and A. Roy Thurik
9 505 / A Meer over winkelopenstellingstijden; H.J. Gianotten en H.J. Heere s
9 50 6 / I I n t e rs t ratos; een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden van de Inters t ra t o s - d a t a s e t ;
Jan de Ko k
9 507 / E Union cove rage and sectoral wages: evidence from the Netherlands; Marcel H.C.
L ever and Wessel A. Marq u e r i n g
9 50 8 / N O n t w i k keling van de gro o t t e k l a s s e n ve rdeling in de Nederlandse Industrie; Sjaak
Vo l l e b re g t
9 50 9 / E Firm size and employment determination in Dutch manufacturing industries;
M a rcel H.C. Leve r
9 510 / N E n t re p re n e u rship: visies en benaderingen; Bob van Dijk en Roy Thurik
9 511 / A De toegevoegde wa a rde van de detailhandel; enkele ve r k l a rende theorieën tegen
de achterg rond van ontwikkelingen in distributiekolom, technologie en ex t e r n e
o m g eving; J.T. Nienhuis en H.J. Gianotten
9 51 2 / N Haalbaarheidsonderzoek MANAG E M E N T-model; onderzoek naar de mogelijk-
heden voor een simulatiemodel van het bedrijfsleven, gebaseerd op gedetail-
l e e rde  branche-  en  bedrijfsgegevens;  Aad  Kleijweg,  Sander  We n n e ke rs, To n
Kwaak en Nico van der Wijst
9 51 3 / A Chippen in binnen- en buitenland; De elektronische portemonnee in kaart ge-
b racht; een ve r kenning van toepassingen, mogelijkheden en consequenties va n
de chipcard als elektronische portemonnee in binnen- en buitenland; drs. J.
Ro o rda en drs. W. J . P. Vo g e l e s a n g
9 6 01 / N O m z e t p rognoses voor de detailhandel; Pieter Fr i s, Aad Kleijweg en Jan de Ko k
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Appendix:  Data description9 6 02 / N F l exibiliteit in de Nederlandse Industrie; N.J. Re i n c ke
9 6 03 / E The Decision between Internal and External R&D; David B. Au d retsch, Albert J.
M e n k veld and A. Roy Thurik
9 6 0 4 / E Job  creation  by  size  class:  measurement  and  empirical  investigation;  Aad
K l e i j weg and Henry Nieuwe n h u i j s e n
9 6 05 / N Het effect van een beursnotering; drs. K.R. Jonkheer
9 6 0 6 / N Een Micro - we r kgelegenheidsmodel voor de Detailhandel; drs. P. Fr i s
9 6 07 / E Demand for and wages of high- and low-skilled labour in the Netherlands;
M.H.C. Lever and A.S.R. van der Linden
9 701 / N Arbeidsomstandigheden  en  bedrijfsgro o t t e.  Een  ve r kenning  met  de  LISREL-
methode; drs. L.H.M. Bosch en drs. J.M.P. de Ko k
9 702 / E The impact of competition on prices and wages in Dutch manufacturing indus-
tries; Marcel H.C. Leve r
9 703 / A FAMOS, een financieringsmodel naar grootteklassen; drs. W.H.J. Ve r h o eve n
9 70 4 / N B a n e n c reatie door MKB en GB; Pieter Fr i s, Henry Nieuwenhuijsen en Sjaak
Vo l l e b re g t
9 705 / N Naar een bedrijfstypenmodel van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven, drs. W. H . M .
van der Hoeven, drs. J.M.P. de Kok en drs. A. Kwa a k
9 8 01 / E The  Knowledge  Society,  Entre p re n e u rship  and  Unemployment,  David  B.
Au d retsch and A. Roy Thurik
9 8 02 / A Firm Fa i l u re and Industrial Dynamics in the Netherlands, David B. Au d re t s c h ,
Patrick Houweling and A. Roy Thurik
9 8 03 / E The determinants of employment in Euro p e, the USA and Japan, André van Stel
9 8 0 4 / E P R I S M A’98:  Po l i cy  Re s e a rch  Instrument  for  Size-aspects  in  Macro - e c o n o m i c
A n a l ys i s, Ton Kwa a k
9 8 05 / N B a n e n c reatie bij het Klein-, Midden- en Grootbedrijf, Henry Nieuwe n h u i j s e n ,
Ben van der Eijken en Ron van Dijk
9 8 0 6 / A Milieumodel, drs. K.L. Bangma
9 8 07 / A B a r r i e rs for hiring personnel; Jacques Niehof
9 8 0 8 / A Methodiek kosten en baten Arbowe t g eving; drs. K.M.P. Bro u we rs, dr. B.I. va n
der Burg, drs. A.F.M. Nijsen en ir. H.C. Visee
9 8 0 9 / E Business Ownership and Economic Growth; An Empirical Investigation; Martin
C a r re e, André van Stel, Roy Thurik and Sander We n n e ke rs
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